---
title: "KYE™ Tool & MCP Authority Register™ — runtime-bound MC-7 · KYE Protocol™"
description: "The KYE™ Tool & MCP Authority Register™ is the tenant-scoped, signed register declaring every tool and MCP server an agent may invoke. The KYE™ Tool Authority Engine™ checks every agent tool call against the register; unregistered calls are refused. Productises EC-Council ADG MC-7 (Tools & MCP Register) as a runtime-bound artefact. Pilot SKU available."
url: https://kyeprotocol.com/tool-mcp-authority-register/
lang: en
source: "KYE Protocol"
---

> The KYE™ Tool & MCP Authority Register™ is the tenant-scoped, signed register declaring every tool and MCP server an agent may invoke. The KYE™ Tool Authority Engine™ checks every agent tool call against the register; unregistered calls are refused. Productises EC-Council ADG MC-7 (Tools & MCP Register) as a runtime-bound artefact. Pilot SKU available.

KYE™ Tool & MCP Authority Register™

# The MCP-tool authority surface KYE™ proves per invocation.

EC-Council ADG names MC-7 — the Tools & MCP Register — as a minimum control for any organisation running AI agents. The KYE™ Tool & MCP Authority Register™ productises MC-7 as a tenant-scoped, signed, runtime-bound artefact. The KYE™ Tool Authority Engine™ checks every agent tool call against the register; unregistered tool calls are refused; every permitted call emits a tool\_call\_pin evidence event sealed at T=0. The canonical schema is `kye.tool_mcp_register.v1`; the sample register lives at `public/examples/tool-mcp-register/sample-register.json`.

[Apply for the 8-week pilot](https://kyeprotocol.com/pilot-apply/) See the sample register Trust-tier ladder

What the register declares

## Per entry — everything the runtime needs to refuse or admit a tool call.

Nine fields per tool. An operator fills them once; the gate checks them on every call.

- **Trust tier.** One of tier-0 untrusted, tier-1 sandboxed, tier-2 scoped, tier-3 trusted. The tier is the floor for every other field on the entry.
- **Permitted agents.** Which agent URNs may invoke the tool. Any other agent is refused at the gate.
- **Permitted actions.** Which action verbs the tool exposes. Anything not on the list is refused.
- **Data access scope.** Data classes, regions, and rate limit. A tool that touches PII outside its declared regions is refused.
- **Write permissions.** none / tenant-scoped-write / system-of-record-write / external-side-effect. Each lift demands a higher approval threshold.
- **Approval threshold.** auto / single-approver / two-person / two-person-with-legal / super-admin. The threshold gates the call into GovernedUI™ when required.
- **Evidence requirements.** Which canonical evidence schemas MUST be emitted per invocation. Missing evidence = retroactively inadmissible.
- **Finality conditions.** The terminal conditions for the call — e.g. settled-or-reversed, replay-proof-derivable, federation-chain-resolved.
- **Assurance review cadence.** last\_assurance\_review + next\_assurance\_review — the register decays without periodic re-review.

Trust-tier ladder

## Four tiers — scope grows; floor moves with it.

Each tier raises the write ceiling and, with it, the approval and evidence floor an auditor can hold you to.

| Tier | Write permission ceiling | Approval threshold floor | Evidence floor |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| tier-0 untrusted | none | single-approver | tool\_call\_pin |
| tier-1 sandboxed | none | auto | tool\_call\_pin + evidence pack |
| tier-2 scoped | tenant-scoped-write | single-approver | tool\_call\_pin + evidence pack + decision map |
| tier-3 trusted | external-side-effect / system-of-record-write | two-person (or two-person-with-legal) | tool\_call\_pin + evidence pack + admissibility + replay-proof + attestation |

Sample register

## Five entries spanning the ladder — canonical at `sample-register.json`.

Five worked entries, one per rung, that you can copy as a starting register.

- **Experimental research LLM (tier-0).** Public-only data, no write permission, single-approver, read-only finality.
- **Sanctions screener sandbox (tier-1).** Pseudonymous PII, no write permission, auto-approval, session-bounded read.
- **Case management write API (tier-2).** Tenant-scoped write, single-approver, write bound to case\_id, human-approver recorded.
- **Faster Payments rail adapter (tier-3).** External side-effect, two-person approval above threshold, settled-or-reversed finality, replay-proof derivable.
- **Cross-org settlement bridge (tier-3).** External side-effect + system-of-record write, two-person-with-legal, federation-chain-resolved, authority finality recorded.

ADG MC-7 mapping

## ADG declares the control. KYE™ makes it refuse the call.

ADG MC-7 says a register must exist. KAC™-4 makes the register the thing that denies the call.

- **ADG MC-7 (Tools & MCP Register).** "Every tool an agent calls MUST be enumerated in a register with trust tier, permitted scope, evidence requirements." The KYE™ Tool & MCP Authority Register™ is that register, materialised as a signed JSON document the KYE™ Tool Authority Engine™ reads on every invocation.
- **KAC™-4 (Tool / MCP Authority Register).** The runtime-side mirror of MC-7. Unregistered tool calls are refused at the gate, not flagged in post-hoc analytics.
- **tool\_call\_pin (the side-effect binding).** Each permitted call emits a `kye.evidence.tool_call_pin.v1` event binding the tool invocation to the admitted grant. Prompt injection cannot retrofit authority after the fact.

## 8-week pilot. £75,000. One tenant. Up to 25 tool/MCP entries.

Bring your existing tool catalogue and MCP topology. The pilot delivers the register definition, the Tool Authority Engine binding for your runtime, per-tier evidence binding, and Replay-Proof™ derivation. Outcome: every agent tool call you run for the pilot tenant is admissible-or-refused at the gate, with evidence sealed at T=0.

[Apply →](https://kyeprotocol.com/pilot-apply/) [KAC™-1..KAC™-12](https://kyeprotocol.com/authority-controls/) [ADG crosswalk](https://kyeprotocol.com/adg-crosswalk/)

Canonical KYE™ surfaces referenced on this page: [Evidence Pack™](https://kyeprotocol.com/evidence-pack/) · [KYE™ MCP Server](https://kyeprotocol.com/mcp/) · [KYE Protocol™](https://kyeprotocol.com/).
